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 The existence of "undermining futures" appears to show that a contradiction can be
 deduced from the conjunction of Humean supervenience (HS) about chance and the
 Principal Principle. A number of strategies for rescuing HS from this problem have
 been proposed recently. In this paper, a novel way of defending HS from the threat is
 presented, and it is argued that this defense has advantages not shared by others. In
 particular, it requires no revisionism about chance, and it is equally available to de-
 fenders of HS who hold HS to be necessary and those who hold it to be contingent.
 1. Introduction. In the mid-1980s, David Lewis, the great champion of
 Humean supervenience (henceforth HS), feared that his beloved thesis
 might fall at the hands of chance. This was because of very strange phe-
 nomena known as underminingfutures (Lewis 1986a, xiv-xv). The existence
 of undermining futures appears to be implied by any account of chance
 consistent with HS. Lewis's fear was that the existence of undermining
 futures, together with the Principal Principle-a thesis he took to be un-
 assailable-entailed a contradiction. This problem was so troubling to
 Lewis that he dubbed it "the big bad bug" (Lewisl986a, xiv).
 Two strategies may be employed in attempting to save HS from the
 bug. The first strategy involves accepting the argument that derives a con-
 tradiction from HS together with the Principal Principle, and rejecting the
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 latter. Since, as Lewis argues, the Principal Principle seems to be intimately
 tied up with our understanding of chance, this strategy arguably must be
 somewhat conceptually revisionary. John Halpin (1994), Ned Hall (1994),
 Michael Thau (1994), and Lewis (1994) himself have advocated versions
 of this strategy. The other strategy is to try to block the derivation of the
 contradiction. Peter Vranas (1998) uses a version of this strategy. Vranas's
 objection to the derivation depends on Lewis's view that HS is a contin-
 gent truth rather than a necessary one. Vranas's argument successfully
 rescues HS understood in this way, but it leaves the stronger claim that
 HS is necessarily true in the clutches of the bug. This stronger version of
 HS is of interest as well, and some of us find it more plausible than Lewis's
 own view: the considerations that motivate HS in the first place seem to
 many of us to motivate the claim that HS is necessarily true. In this paper
 I will argue that the derivation of the contradiction can be blocked without
 appeal to the contingent status of HS. This strategy will require a slight
 modification to Lewis's formulation of the Principal Principle, but this
 modification will not involve any revisionism about our concept of chance.
 Indeed, I will argue that this modification is motivated by the very reasons
 Lewis himself gives for accepting the Principal Principle in the first place.
 The upshot is that even those who view HS as necessarily true, and who
 do not want to engage in revisionism about the concept of chance, have
 nothing to fear from the bug.
 2. Chance and Humean Supervenience. Chance is understood here as a
 probability distribution defined over a set of possible events or a set of
 propositions. The chance distribution varies from possible world to pos-
 sible world, and from time to time within a single possible world. Chance
 is here taken to be objective. What is meant by the objectivity of chance is
 a question that I can't treat here. But to a first approximation, the idea
 is that the chance distribution at a particular world at a particular time is
 determined by features of that world that are objective in the sense that
 they do not depend on the knowledge, beliefs, or interests of epistemic
 subjects.
 But to say only this is to leave open what chance is. There are uncount-
 ably many probability distributions that can be defined as functions of the
 objective features of a possible world at a given time. Only one of these is
 supposed to be singled out by the label "chance." How is this privileged
 probability distribution singled out? Lewis has famously proposed a nec-
 essary condition on any distribution that deserves the name "chance": the
 chance distribution is one that is related to credence in a way specified by
 the Principal Principle:
 (PP) Let P be the chance distribution for a given world at a given time.
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 Then at that world at that time, for any reasonable initial credence
 function C, for any admissible evidence E which specifies the
 chance of A:
 C(A/E) = P(A).
 A "reasonable initial credence function" is a probability distribution rep-
 resenting the degrees of belief of an ideally rational epistemic subject,
 whose beliefs would remain rational after conditionalizing on new evi-
 dence as it came in. Evidence is "admissible" only if it does not contain
 any "intelligence from the future" concerning how chancy future events
 will turn out. So the basic idea underlying the PP is simply that the chance
 distribution is one with the following property: when a cognizer like one
 of us gets admissible information about this distribution, she ought to set
 her degrees of belief accordingly. If I know that the chance of my winning
 the lottery is 1 over 10 billion, and I have no crystal ball which allows me
 reliably to predict the future, then I ought to set my degree of belief that
 I will win at 1 over 10 billion. To set it any higher or lower would be
 irrational. According to Lewis, PP is a reasonable principle because it
 "seems ... to capture all we know about chance" (Lewis 1986b, 86). I'll
 return to the issue of why we should accept PP later in this paper.
 (Since the supposed problem of undermining futures presupposes PP,
 which is phrased in terms of reasonable credence functions, the whole
 discussion is situated within a broadly Bayesian framework. I will continue
 working within this framework in this paper. It may well be that Bayes-
 ianism is wrong-headed; if so, then much of what follows will be wrong-
 headed as well, but then so will be the very statement of the problem that
 I'm trying to solve. If the statement of the problem is actually based on a
 confusion, then the battle here is already won.)
 HS about chance is the thesis that the facts about chance are all fixed
 by a certain range of the world's features. Call this range "the Humean
 base." More precisely, the thesis might be formulated as follows:
 No two possible worlds agree with respect to their Humean bases but
 differ with respect to chance.
 This is the way some philosophers define "HS" (see, e.g., Carroll 1994).
 If that thesis is true, then it is necessarily true. But Lewis maintains that
 HS is only a contingent truth, true of our world and of all possible worlds
 in the "inner sphere" of worlds most similar to ours, but not of all possible
 worlds whatsoever (Lewis 1986a, x). So Lewis's version of the thesis is not
 the one above, but rather this one:
 No two possible worlds within the "inner sphere" agree with respect
 to their Humean bases but differ with respect to chance.
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 If my argument in this paper is correct, then nothing important to the
 problem of undermining futures depends on the choice between these two
 definitions of HS.
 The "Humean base" is usually defined as the arrangement of local
 qualities in spacetime. These "local qualities" are supposed to be partic-
 ular, occurrent features of the world. Such things as mass density, charge
 density, the presence of hard atoms, the presence of nothing but vacuum,
 etc., count as local qualities; what is forbidden are such things as global
 features of the world, dispositions, modal properties, or irreducibly prob-
 abilistic properties.
 One analysis of objective chance that is consistent with HS is the naive
 frequentist view, according to which the chance that any given event of
 type T having an outcome O is just the long-run relative frequency with
 which events of type T have outcome O. A more sophisticated view of
 chance consistent with HS is implied by Lewis's best-system analysis, the
 details of which I won't go into here (see Lewis 1994, 480-482). On this
 account, while the chances need not equal the actual long-run frequencies,
 they cannot vary in a way completely independent of the frequencies.
 Roughly speaking, frequencies will guide chances in such a way that other
 things being equal, a significant difference in frequencies will make for a
 difference in chances. It is plausible that this kind of connection between
 frequencies and chances will be implied by any reasonable view of chance
 consistent with HS. For big differences in frequencies are big differences
 in the Humean base, and differences in the Humean base can make for
 differences in chances, according to HS. Furthermore, frequencies are one
 of the features of the Humean base that, intuitively speaking, ought to be
 especially relevant to chances.
 3. Undermining Futures. The phenomenon of undermining futures arises
 in the following way. The chance distribution at a given world at a given
 time supervenes not just on its past and present, but on its entire history-
 more specifically, on the entire history of its Humean base (Lewis 1994,
 483-484). It follows that at a typical time, there are multiple possible fu-
 tures, some of which would result in different present chance distributions
 than the one that actually obtains. An undermining future is a possible
 future that (i) would result in a different present chance distribution than
 the one that actually obtains, and (ii) currently has a non-zero chance of
 transpiring.
 For example, consider a possible world w, and a typical moment t in
 the history of w. Suppose that there is a kind of event that occurs a great
 many times in w-call it a "coin toss." Coin tosses have two possible
 outcomes, "heads" and "tails," and suppose that in w, the chance that
 any particular coin-toss will give the result "heads" is 1/2. Additionally,
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 suppose that in w there will only be finitely many coin-tosses. But the
 number of coin tosses there will be is astronomical-say, on the order of
 Avogadro's number. Finally, suppose that at time t, only a tiny fraction
 of all these coin tosses have taken place so far.
 In world w at moment t, there is a tiny but non-zero chance that every
 future coin toss will turn up "heads." Consider a possible world whose
 Humean base perfectly matches that of w up to moment t, but in which
 this surprising long run of heads comes to pass. It seems that on any decent
 account of chance that is consistent with HS, the chance in such a world
 of getting "heads" on any given coin toss is not 1/2, but is rather somewhat
 greater. This is because of the aforementioned way in which chances must
 tend to follow frequencies if HS is correct. So such a long run of heads
 constitutes an undermining future for world w at moment t. In w at t, the
 following is true: such an astounding future run of heads has a non-zero
 chance of coming about, but if it were to come about, then the present
 chance of getting heads on any given toss would be different from what
 it actually, currently, is. Such a future would undermine the present, actual
 chance distribution.
 This undermining future also has the feature that if it were to come to
 pass, then its own present chance would be different from what it actually
 is. Since the chance of getting heads on any given toss is higher, the chance
 of getting a very long but finite run of heads is also higher. Call an un-
 dermining future with this feature a self-undermining future.
 The phenomenon of undermining futures is palpably weird. Its weird-
 ness can be brought out in this way: there is currently a non-zero chance
 that something will happen such that, if it were to happen, then the present
 chances would have different values from the ones they in fact have. As
 Lewis writes, "It's not that if this future came about, the truth about the
 present would change retrospectively. Rather, it would never have been
 what it actually is, and would always have been something different"
 (Lewis 1994, 482-483). So there is currently a non-zero chance that the
 present chances have values other than the ones they in fact do have. That
 smells pretty peculiar. And its peculiarity seems to reflect badly on HS
 about chance.
 Lewis himself isn't bothered by views with merely peculiar conse-
 quences, as his readers are well aware. He is bothered by contradictions,
 though. And when you put the existence of self-undermining futures to-
 gether with PP, a contradiction can be derived. Here's the derivation: Let
 F be a self-undermining future. Let E be an admissible evidence statement
 that specifies the present chance of the truth of a proposition F concerning
 the future; i.e., E entails that the chance of F has some particular value,
 x. Since F is a self-undermining future, x is not zero, but in any possible
 world in which F is true, the present chance of F is something other than
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 x. Since E entails that the chance of F is x, and F entails that the chance
 of F is not x, E and F are inconsistent. So for any reasonable initial cre-
 dence function C, C(F/E) is zero. But by PP, C(F/E) = x, which is not
 equal to zero. That's a contradiction.
 The apparent upshot is that the existence of chance, HS about chance,
 and PP form an inconsistent triad. This is what has invited the various
 rescue maneuvers mentioned earlier. I will argue here that no such rescue
 maneuver is needed. We need, instead, to recognize that the derivation of
 the contradiction just rehearsed depends on an inappropriate use of PP.
 The inappropriateness of this use is revealed by a proper understanding
 of the motivation of this principle.
 4. Dissolving the Problem. Let's return to the question of why PP seemed
 like a good idea in the first place. Credences and chances are different
 kinds of probability; why should we expect there to be any link between
 them at all? The answer to this question, I think, is the following: even
 if meaning isn't the same thing as use, our use of the notion of chance
 must place constraints on what can qualify as the referent of our word
 "chance." Furthermore, it seems that the primary function of the notion
 of chance in our epistemic practice is this: we let our best estimations of
 the chances of chancy events guide our degrees of belief about those
 events. PP is just an attempt to express the way in which we do this.
 But it is not an attempt to describe merely our actual applications of
 the notion of chance. Rather, this attempt involves a certain degree of
 idealization: chance is related by PP to reasonable credence functions,
 which introduce an idealization into the study of our actual epistemic
 practices. It seems perfectly legitimate to introduce some kind of ideali-
 zation here. What we refer to by "chance" has to be constrained by our
 use of the concept of chance. However, a liberal understanding of our use
 of this concept can allow that this use includes not just how we actually
 set our degrees of belief in the light of our best estimates about chances,
 but also how we take it that we ought to set our degrees of belief in the
 light of these estimates.
 The motivation for PP, then, seems to be the plausible idea that we
 ought to let our best estimate of the chance of a future event guide our
 degree of belief that that event will occur. But as Lewis himself notes, the
 formulation of PP given above, which is used in the derivation of the
 contradiction, expresses only one very special case of the way this guiding
 takes place (Lewis 1986b, 87). For it applies only to evidence which spec-
 ifies the chance of some event or proposition. Unfortunately, we generally
 have to make do with evidence that is less informative, evidence which
 provides some information about the chance of some future event, but
 that does not entail that this chance has any one particular value.
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 For example, suppose that I have good evidence that tells me that a
 certain coin is either fair, or else is rigged so that it will always turn up
 heads. Further, suppose that my evidence makes both of these possibilities
 seem equally likely. To what degree should I believe that the next toss of
 this coin will turn up heads? In the circumstances described, I ought to
 believe to degree 1/2 that the coin is fair, in which case it has a 1/2 chance
 of turning up heads; I ought to believe to degree /2 that the coin is rigged,
 in which case it has a chance of 1 of turning up heads. So my degree of
 belief that the coin will turn up heads should be:
 1/2 X 1/2 + 1/2 X 1 = 3/4
 The general principle at work here is the following: to figure out the degree
 to which I ought to believe that a certain chancy future outcome will occur,
 I should take a weighted average of all the epistemically possible values
 of the chance of that outcome, where the weight for a particular value is
 just my rational degree of belief that the chance has that value. Recogniz-
 ing all this, Lewis writes that the most general form of the Principal Prin-
 ciple is the following:
 (GPP) C(A/E) = ExC(Xx/E)x,
 where Xx is the proposition that the chance of A is x (Lewis 1986b, 87).
 So the equation I've labeled "PP" is really just a very special limiting
 case of the true principle relating chance and credence that, as Lewis
 writes, "seems ... to capture all we know about chance" (Lewis 1986b,
 86). The true principle, which applies most generally, is what I've labeled
 "GPP." Furthermore, PP is a special case of GPP that applies only to
 cases that are impossible in principle. Recall that PP applies to the evi-
 dence E only if E specifies the objective chance of the proposition A. That
 means that E does something that real evidence never does, namely, entail
 that the chance of A has some particular value. In cases in which we reason
 about chances, we typically possess evidence that gives some degree of
 confirmation to claims about the chances of various kinds of events oc-
 curring under various circumstances, and this kind of evidence can indeed
 rationally constrain our credences concerning future events. But real evi-
 dence never constrains these credences by specifying the objective chances
 of such events. Indeed, if HS is correct, there could be such evidence only
 if there were no problem of induction. This is because, on a Humean
 supervenientist account of chance, the chances supervene on the entire
 history of the world, including the future. Thus, in order to fall within the
 domain of PP, a piece of evidence E would have to entail (and not merely
 make probable) contingent information about the future, something that
 no evidence in principle available to creatures like us could ever do.
 The reason why we ought to believe GPP is this: if rational epistemic
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 practices are to be modeled using probability distributions, then GPP ex-
 presses the way in which we ought to make use of our evidence about
 chance to guide our beliefs about the future. This same reason also mo-
 tivates the addition of a clause to GPP: GPP applies to evidence E only if
 E is an evidence proposition that empirical cognizers like ourselves could,
 in principle, encounter as evidence. This is because GPP is supposed to be
 a normative principle regulating the rational maintenance of expectations
 for the future by subjects like us, whose epistemic access to the world is
 empirical. Such a normative principle should only be expected to apply to
 situations that such subjects could, in principle, face. It shouldn't be ex-
 pected to give any answer at all to the question of what such subjects
 should do in situations that they could not possibly find themselves in. (It
 may be objected that GPP and PP should both be accepted without such
 a restrictive clause because they represent basic features of chance that we
 can know a priori. But my procedure here involves taking the grounds for
 GPP to be its virtues as an explication of the way in which we use the
 concept of chance, rather than any supposed a priori insight into the na-
 ture of chance. I claim that the former is a more legitimate guide than the
 latter, and that the latter motivates GPP only subject to the restrictive
 clause.)
 If we restrict GPP so that it applies only to cases where the evidence E
 is evidence that is possible for finite empirical cognizers to obtain, then
 the reductio concerning undermining futures is blocked. This reductio
 works by deriving both that C(F/E) = 0 and that C(F/E) > 0. With the
 restriction just proposed, there is no way to derive that C(F/E) = 0. That
 equation was derived by appealing to the inconsistency of the evidence E
 with the proposition F. F is a proposition about the future that is supposed
 to be consistent with the actual occurrent history of the world up to the
 present. Trivially, no empirical evidence derived from past and present
 observations could be inconsistent with any proposition about the future
 that is consistent with the occurrent history up through the present. So, if
 E is a piece of evidence that empirical cognizers like ourselves could en-
 counter, or even one that ideally rational empirical cognizers could en-
 counter, then it could not be inconsistent with the proposition F.
 The problem here is not simply that the reductio makes a simplifying
 assumption that is dispensable in a more rigorous analysis: without the
 requirement of inconsistency between the evidence E and the possible fu-
 ture F, the contradiction cannot be derived; it isn't enough for E simply
 to make F extremely unlikely. Perhaps there is some other way of deriving
 a contradiction from the existence of undermining futures together with
 GPP subject to the restriction I've recommended, but there does not ap-
 pear to be one that works in basically the same way as Lewis's argument.
 Some totally new argument would be required.
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 5. Is There Another Problem with GPP-cum-HS? How might such a new
 argument go? In this section I will explore one way of trying to generate
 a problem for GPP and HS analogous to Lewis's reductio, and argue that
 it won't work.
 The GPP says that, for any possible empirical evidence E, and any
 reasonable initial credence function C, the following relation holds:
 (GPP) C(A/E) = ExC(Xx/E)x.
 By probability theory, C must satisfy
 C(A/E) = xC(Xx/E)C(A/X,). (1)
 Hence, C will satisfy GPP iff
 ExC(Xx/E)x = ZxC(Xx/E)C(A/X,). (2)
 Suppose that A is a self-undermining future for a chance distribution that
 assigns A the non-zero chance z. Then, C(A/Xz) = 0, but z is nonzero. So
 the term in the right-hand side of (2) corresponding to the value x = z is
 lower than the corresponding term on the left-hand side. In order for the
 equality to hold, then, there must be at least some values of x for which
 the term on the right-hand side is greater than the corresponding term on
 the left-hand side, that is,
 C(A/Xx) > x. (3)
 This seems odd, for it seems to say that for some A and some x, given the
 hypothesis that the chance of A is x, it is rational to believe A to a degree
 higher than x. Perhaps this is so implausible that one or more of the
 assumptions that lead to it must be rejected.
 But it isn't clear that this is the case. Note that (3) can only be derived
 when A is a proposition that could be an undermining future for some
 present chance distribution. So A must be extremely informative. For it
 must definitely rule out very many possible chance distributions. (Recall
 the paradigm case of an undermining future discussed earlier: the prop-
 osition that the astronomically many coin-tosses yet to come will all turn
 up heads.) Perhaps any proposition definitely rules out very many chance
 distributions, namely, those that assign that very proposition a chance of
 zero. (I say "perhaps" since zero probability does not necessarily entail
 falsity.) But a proposition like A, which is informative enough to be an
 underminer, is special because it definitely rules out many chance distri-
 butions other than those that assign A itself a chance of zero.
 Suppose that A is informative enough to be an underminer, and that x
 is a relatively high possible value of the chance of A that A itself does not
 rule out. Now consider a rational agent whose epistemic practices are to
 be modeled by a reasonable credence function. The conditional probabil-
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 ities of such a function, C(B/D), can be thought of as modeling how much
 confidence the agent would be willing to grant B, in a hypothetical case
 in which she accepts D. If the agent were to accept, hypothetically, the
 proposition Xx, this would give her grounds for high confidence in the
 truth of A deriving from two different sources. The first is simply that X,
 assigns a rather high chance to A. Admittedly, it is hard to see why this
 gives her reason to assign confidence to A to a degree any higher than x.
 But she also has a second ground for confidence in A. For A definitely
 rules out a large number of possible chance distributions that are incon-
 sistent with Xx. Hence, Xx definitely rules out a large number of chance
 distributions that are inconsistent with A (in addition to those that are
 inconsistent with A just because they assign a zero chance to A). Accepting
 Xx, then, ought to boost her confidence in A. For, after learning Xx, she
 can rule out very many possibilities inconsistent with A that she couldn't
 rule out before.
 This boost in her credence in A is distinct from the one provided by
 the fact that Xx assigns a high chance to A. For if A were not specific
 enough to be an underminer, there would be no such second boost, but
 there would still be the boost due to the high chance assigned to A. Thus,
 Xx gives her a reason to assign a higher credence to A that goes beyond
 the reason that Xx gives A a relatively high chance. Hence, it is reasonable
 for the inequality (3) to hold for an underminer A and a relatively high
 value of x. In this way, the apparent objection to the truth of (2) is avoided.
 Now consider the case in which A is not informative enough to be an
 underminer. In this case, there doesn't appear to be any reason why
 C(A/Xx) could not be equal to x. Indeed, if it is true that
 For any reasonable credence function C, and any proposition A (4)
 that is not informative enough to be an underminer, C(A/Xx) = x,
 then (2) will be satisfied for this value of A. Hence, by probability theory,
 so will (GPP), and a fortiori so will (GPP) be restricted to possible em-
 pirical evidence. It is tempting to say that (4) states a necessary require-
 ment on initial credence functions. Doing so would not be inconsistent
 with the proposal of Section 3. It would not permit the derivation of
 Lewis's contradiction (since (4) is restricted to non-undermining futures).
 Further, it would vindicate Lewis's original PP for propositions that are
 not informative enough to be underminers. So it would capture our in-
 tuition that in "normal" cases the original PP is just fine, and it would
 capture this intuition in the most straightforward way, by implying that
 PP is exactly true in such cases.
 6. Comparative Virtues of This Solution. Lewis's own way of beating the
 bug involves rejecting PP in favor of a different principle called NP. For
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 Lewis this involves a price, since PP is, for Lewis, "the key to our concept
 of chance" (Lewis 1994, 489). Giving up such a fundamental principle
 feels like giving up the notion of chance itself! But the price is not too high
 to bear, in Lewis's estimation, because in "normal" cases PP is approxi-
 mately true. It appears that the results of applying NP differ non-negligibly
 from the results of applying PP only in very unusual cases, such as cases
 of undermining futures, which are not the cases our intuitions about
 chance are honed on. "[N]ear enough is good enough," writes Lewis (1994,
 489). But surely even nearer is even better.
 I've argued that the legitimate motivation for PP motivates only the
 more general GPP with the qualification that it is only to be applied to
 evidence statements that could really be empirical evidence. That principle,
 I submit, is the real key to our concept of chance. I've shown that when
 that principle is joined with HS, they are together not threatened by the
 existence of undermining futures, and so we can uphold HS and simul-
 taneously maintain that the key principle concerning our concept of
 chance is exactly true. Furthermore, as the last section showed, this view
 is consistent with the claim that Lewis's original PP itself is exactly true
 for all cases except those involving propositions informative enough to
 undermine chance distributions. Even if the price Lewis pays is not exces-
 sive, we can get a better bargain; so we should. The availability of a better
 bargain has already been demonstrated by Vranas (1998), but his bargain
 is available only to those who defend HS as a contingent truth. What I've
 shown here is that defenders of HS as a necessary truth needn't be denied
 the same benefit.
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